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Law, Politics and Legacy Building at 
the McLachlin Court in 2014 
Jamie Cameron* 
I. WHATEVER HAPPENS, HAPPENS1 
From fall 2013, through much of 2014 and almost without respite up 
to mid-2015, the McLachlin Court and its Chief Justice commanded 
headlines in the legal and political news of the day. Much of this 
stemmed from the brouhaha arising from the Nadon appointment, the 
Appointment Reference and the subsequent political attack on the Chief 
Justice.2 Though the debacle was messy and sensational, 2014 should 
principally and more appropriately be remembered as a year of legacy 
making for Chief Justice McLachlin and her Court.  
Quantitative numbers suggest a year of business as usual because the 
volume of cases and success rates for claims fit the general pattern of 
recent years.3 Any peek beyond the data quickly reveals how impressions 
can mislead. It would be difficult, for instance, to overstate the 
importance of the two References in spring 2014, and the challenge to the 
Chief Justice’s integrity that ensued.4 In the aftermath, the Court 
continued with pioneering decisions in Tsilhqot’in Nation, recognizing 
Aboriginal title and Trial Lawyers, protecting access to justice under 
                                                                                                                       
* Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School. I thank Kendall Grant (J.D. 2015) and Megan 
Rourke (J.D. 2017) for providing valuable research assistance, and also thank my colleagues Sonia 
Lawrence and Benjamin L. Berger for commenting on a draft of the article. 
1 K. Makin, “Ten years as top judge and she’s still losing sleep”, The Globe and Mail (January 7, 
2010) (quoting McLachlin C.J.C.), online: <http:// www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/ten-years-as-
top-judge-and-shes-still-losing-sleep/article1366103/>. 
2 Infra, note 4. 
3 See infra, II. Taking the Court’s Vitals. 
4 Reference re Supreme Court Act, ss. 5 and 6, [2014] S.C.J. No. 21, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 433 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Appointment Reference”]; Reference re Senate Reform, [2014] S.C.J. No. 32, 
[2014] 1 S.C.R. 704 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Senate Reference”]. See generally, L. Sossin, “Court 
Dismissed: Harper v. McLachlin” The Walrus (January-February 2015), online: <http://thewalrus.ca/ 
court-dismissed/> (describing and discussing this chain of events). 
4 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2015) 71 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
section 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867.5 Then, early 2015 saw a major 
correction to 2014’s modest gains on rights when the Court issued a 
series of Charter6 decisions, three of which dispatched long-standing 
precedent without ado. These “precedent busters” further constitutionalized 
labour relations, granted the right to strike its long-awaited 
“constitutional benediction,” and invalidated Criminal Code7 provisions 
relating to assisted suicide.8 Before slowing the pace the Court registered 
further Charter wins on solicitor-client privilege, religious freedom, 
mandatory minimum sentences, and minority language rights.9 Needless 
to say, with the McLachlin Court stepping up in this sure-footed way, 
2014’s unremarkable data are subject to important caveats. 
Developments that would be notable at any time are especially 
remarkable in the 15-year history of the McLachlin Court. Over its 
tenure, this Court has been thought of and described as pragmatic and 
even workmanlike. Constitutional rights have been advanced in a careful, 
selective manner and with limited drama. Review has been contained 
rather than boisterous; transformative decisions are few in number  
and have surfaced at intervals.10 On the Charter’s 30th anniversary, one 
                                                                                                                       
5 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3. See Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, [2014] S.C.J.  
No. 44, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 257 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Tsilhwot’in Nation”]; Trial Lawyers Assn. of British 
Columbia v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2014] S.C.J. No. 59, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 31 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Trial Lawyers”]. 
6 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
7 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
8 Mounted Police Assn. of Ontario v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015] S.C.J. No. 1, 
[2015] 1 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Mounted Police”] (collective bargaining); Saskatchewan 
Federation of Labour v. Saskatchewan, [2015] S.C.J. No. 4, at para. 3, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 245 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “SFL”] (the right to strike); and Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015] S.C.J.  
No. 5, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 331 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Carter”] (assisted suicide). 
9 Canada (Attorney General) v. Federation of Law Societies of Canada, [2015] S.C.J.  
No. 7, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 401 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Federation of Law Societies”] (solicitor-client 
privilege); Loyola High School v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2015] S.C.J. No. 12, 2015 SCC 12 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Loyola High School”]; Mouvement laïque québécois v. Saguenay (City), [2015] 
S.C.J. No. 16, 2015 SCC 16 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Mouvement laïque Québécois”] (religious 
freedom); R. v. Nur, [2015] S.C.J. No. 15, 2015 SCC 15 (S.C.C.) (mandatory minimum sentences); 
and Association des parents de l’école Rose-des-vents v. British Columbia (Education), [2015] S.C.J. 
No. 21, 2015 SCC 21 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Association des parents”] (minority language rights). This 
article refers only to 2015 Supreme Court decisions up to the end of April; the exception is R. v. 
Smith, [2015] S.C.J. No. 34, 2015 SCC 34 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Smith”], infra, note 80. 
10 Examples include Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2001] S.C.J. No. 87, [2001] 
3 S.C.R. 1016 (S.C.C.) (labour relations); Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), [2002] S.C.J. 
No. 66, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519 (S.C.C.) (prisoners’ voting rights); Re Vancouver Sun, [2004] S.C.J. No. 41, 
[2004] 2 S.C.R. 332 (S.C.C.) (open court and investigative hearings under anti-terror legislation); 
Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 33, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 (S.C.C.) (access 
to health care under s. 7); Health Services and Support — Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. 
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commentator remarked that the Charter had become more a “middle-
ground document than an aspirational instrument of progress”, and added 
that “[t]he Court plays a less active role in this iteration, serving more as 
a yeoman of rights than as a leader in thinking deeply about the Charter’s 
promises and how they can be kept.”11 A view that may be unkind 
nonetheless reflects the perception of a Court that — up to this year —
managed expectations and kept outcomes in check. 
Since inception in 2000 and to this day, the McLachlin Court has 
borne the imprint of the Chief Justice and her style of leadership. By 2014, 
Beverley McLachlin had been on the Court for 26 years and is now one of 
its longest-serving members. She is a veteran of the Lamer years, which 
were punctuated by activist and divisive decisions that generated profound 
disagreement — in and outside the Court — about the scope of Charter 
rights and judicial powers. When elevated to the top office in 2000, the 
Chief Justice quickly indicated her determination to address those negative 
dynamics. She promised to replace fractured decision-making with 
collegiality and consensus between the judges, and identified respectful 
relations between the Court and legislature as another key priority.12  
                                                                                                                       
British Columbia, [2007] S.C.J. No. 27, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 391 (S.C.C.) (collective bargaining); 
Canada (Justice) v. Khadr, [2008] S.C.J. No. 28, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 125 (S.C.C.); Canada (Prime 
Minister) v. Khadr, [2010] S.C.J. No. 3, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 44 (S.C.C.) (constitutional violations 
related to detention at Guantanamo Bay); Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Community Services 
Society, [2011] S.C.J. No. 44, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 134 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Insite”] (safe drug 
injection); and Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford, [2013] S.C.J. No. 72, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 1101 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter "Bedford”] (Criminal Code provisions related to prostitution). 
11 J. Cameron, “The McLachlin Court and the Charter in 2012” in B.L. Berger, J. Cameron & 
S. Lawrence, eds., Constitutional Cases 2012 (2013) 63 S.C.L.R. (2d) 15, at 17. Not only a 
worthwhile exercise in humility, this quote points out how much and how quickly the Court’s 
fortunes changed, from 2013 — when that was written — to 2014 and early 2015. 
12 On consensus, see Janice Tibbetts, “Building Consensus” Canadian Lawyer (July 2013) 
24, at 27 (noting that at her first press conference McLachlin C.J.C. identified consensus as one of 
her goals for the Court). In 2013, the Chief Justice explained how this works, indicating that “all of 
us, try to eliminate unnecessary concurrences, unnecessary voices, and we talk a lot, we discuss a 
lot”, and that this discussion “leads us often to eliminate some of the differences which have been 
there”. Id., at 28. 
On institutional relations, the Chief Justice said, in 2004, that “each branch must discharge its role 
with integrity and respect for the proper constitutional roles of the other branches”: G. Galloway, 
“Judges Aren’t Activists, Chief Justice Says”, Globe & Mail (November 23, 2014) at 11. More recently, 
she stated that “[t]he courts have to be respectful of Parliament’s role and the executive’s role”, and 
added that “I think you can see this in our decisions.” She continued, commenting that “[w]e’re often 
giving a measure of deference to ministerial decisions” and we often say “and it’s not just lip service — 
that Parliament has a right to make these and other choices”. In her view, the respect should flow in 
both directions: “I think the people in government have to treat the courts with respect, otherwise we 
will undermine our system and it won’t work very well.” Quoted in J. Brean, “‘Conscious Objectivity’: 
That’s how the chief justice defines the top court’s role. Harper might beg to differ”, National Post 
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In reflecting on the year it is telling that McLachlin C.J.C. has 
described her goals, as leader of the Court and as jurist, in humble 
terms.13 She is committed and pragmatic — unhesitant to protect the 
Constitution at certain junctures, but alive to her intuitive sense of the 
Court’s limited political capital and the need for respectful equilibrium 
between the branches of government. Chief Justice McLachlin confirmed 
these sentiments in 2013, warning that she is not one “for shopping lists 
for the court” and repeating her focus on honest, case-by-case decision-
making.14 She also admitted hoping, simply enough, that the McLachlin 
Court would be remembered as a “productive, respected court”, one that 
takes each case as it is given and tries to do its best on every one of 
them.15 
In personal terms, McLachlin C.J.C. says she has “always wanted to 
be known as a good jurist, as a serious jurist”, and has allowed that she 
would like to be seen as a “competent jurist” who “did her best to decide 
the cases that came before her as well as she could and conscientiously”.16 
In describing what this means, the Chief Justice says that she has “always 
resolved to just try to judge the issues as honestly as [she] can, and not 
think about things in too strategic a manner”.17 Her view is that “[m]y job 
is simply to listen to what the parties have to say, and to do my best to 
understand the position, the ramifications of deciding one way or the other, 
to think about what’s best for Canadian society … and give it my best 
judgment after listening, also, to my eight other colleagues”.18 
The Chief Justice has also commented on the Charter’s trajectory, 
noting in 2010 that the threshold work was completed in the first generation 
of decision-making, leaving her Court to fine tune and deal “mainly with 
subtle interpretations”.19 In her words, “most of the significant Charter of 
Rights battles” have been fought, and her Court is “just building on that”.20 
As far as her tenure as Chief Justice and any legacy are concerned, she was 
content, at the time, to state in noncommittal terms, that “whatever happens, 
                                                                                                                       
(May 23, 2015), online: <http://news.nationalpost.com/news/conscious-objectivity-thats-how-the-chief-
justice-defines-the-top-courts-role-harper-might-beg-to-differ>. 
13 In addition to consensus and respectful relations between institutions, access to justice 
and Supreme Court transparency are other aspirations the Chief Justice has flagged and promoted 
over the years; see, infra, note 64. 
14 Tibbetts, “Building Consensus”, supra, note 12, at 26. 
15 Id., at 26 and 31. 
16 Quoted in Makin, supra, note 1, and Tibbetts, “Building Consensus”, supra, note 12 at 26. 
17 Brean, “Conscious Objectivity”, supra, note 12. 
18 Id. 
19 Makin, supra, note 1. 
20 Id. 
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happens”.21 By this she may have meant only to confirm her philosophy that 
judges are servants of the law and the public office they hold, and discharge 
their duties as such. Consistent with that, McLachlin C.J.C. maintains that 
the Court is “totally passive”, and has remarked that patterns emerge “only 
after a serendipitous line of cases” works its way up to the Court.22  
Against that backdrop, the past year stands in sharp profile: in 
constitutional and Charter domains, and whether wittingly or not, the 
Court generated a legacy-setting jurisprudence. True enough, the federal 
government was spoiling for a fight with the Court in recent years, at 
times forcing the judges to choose between deference to its policies and 
enforcing the Charter’s promises. The Court and public had fair warning 
that the government intended to implement criminal justice policies that 
could not easily be squared with the Charter. In addition, “skirmish” 
decisions foreshadowed the prospect of deeper conflict between the 
institutions.23 There was a certain sense of the Court being pushed to 
allow transgressions or defend the Constitution. This climate preceded 
the political leadership’s rash and astonishing attack on the Chief Justice, 
which was the most extraordinary event of 2014, if not the Court’s entire 
institutional history.  
Setting the political dynamics aside for the moment, the Court’s 
constitutional jurisprudence in this period is striking, because it far 
outstrips the modest goals the Chief Justice has earnestly and valiantly 
proclaimed over the years. Rather than be deterred or intimidated, the 
Court steeled its resolve when the federal government placed the judges 
in the awkward position of confronting the Prime Minister and declaring 
that the appointment of a colleague — already sworn in — was illegal. In 
the Appointment Reference, the Court defended its institutional integrity, 
sent the Prime Minister’s appointee away, and constitutionalized 
Supreme Court appointments. Then, it challenged the federal 
government’s assertion of parliamentary hegemony to amend the Senate, 
and protected the upper house’s position in Canada’s scheme of 
federalism. After the fallout from the References settled, the Court 
pressed on with a series of decisions enforcing constitutional rights 
across a range of high profile issues.  
                                                                                                                       
21 Id. 
22 Brean, “Conscious Objectivity”, supra, note 12, and Makin, supra, note 1 (in reference to 
press freedoms and free expression but noting, as well, that “[i]t wasn’t that we planned it that way, 
but people brought the cases forward, they were good cases, and the law developed as it did”; id.). 
23 See the Khadr decisions, Insite and Bedford, supra, note 10. 
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Throughout, the Court showed poise as a whole, rising above the 
fray to demonstrate solidarity, fortitude, and confidence in its mandate of 
review. In doing so, the judges may have drawn on an existing sense of 
institutional self-sufficiency, but maybe the Court also saw and felt its 
own vulnerability to the exercise of executive power. By advancing, 
rather than retreating after the appointment debacle, the Court galvanized 
its place in Canadian democracy and public life. In that process, the 
McLachlin Court embedded important precedent in the constitutional 
jurisprudence. That narrative presents an interface between law and 
politics that raises searching questions about the identity of the McLachlin 
Court, and its response to the rare institutional pressures of the past year. 
As is customary, this review provides a quantitative survey of the 
Supreme Court’s 2014 constitutional cases and, for the reasons noted, 
incorporates the Court’s early 2015 jurisprudence. After doing so, the 
discussion returns in a brief and final section to the Chief Justice, the 
McLachlin Court and the legacy that was forged in a year of unforgettable 
and singular institutional dynamics.  
II. TAKING THE COURT’S VITALS 
Critical review of the Supreme Court’s constitutional cases is the 
mandate of the annual conference.24 Quantitative analysis of the year’s 
jurisprudence is a key part of that review, and has been a feature of the 
program from the outset.25 Though the case sample may be small, the 
Court’s constitutional numbers provide valuable information and offer a 
platform for exploring themes.26 But what the data reveal is limited and 
must be accompanied by commentary that provides qualitative insight 
and perspective.27  
                                                                                                                       
24 This year’s conference, “The 2014 Constitutional Cases Conference: The 18th Annual Analysis 
of the Constitutional Decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada”, was held on April 10, 2015. The 
conference opens with a keynote overview of the Court’s constitutional jurisprudence, and I thank my 
colleagues Professors Benjamin L. Berger and Sonia Lawrence for inviting me to give that address. 
25 For another review which selects the Court’s top 10 decisions and discusses its work from 
October 31, 2013 to November 30, 2014, see B. Perrin, “The Supreme Court of Canada: Policy-Maker of 
the Year”, MacDonald-Laurier Institute, November 2014, online: <http://www.macdonaldlaurier.ca/ 
files/pdf/MLI_SupremeCourt_NewFinal_web_r2.pdf>. 
26 The annual review articles dating back to 2000, when Beverley McLachlin was appointed 
Chief Justice, can be found at York Digital Journals, online: <http://sclr.journals.yorku.ca/index.php/sclr>. 
27 At the conference, leading constitutional scholars and experts provided deeper analysis 
on the jurisprudence and broader themes, in panels on Indigenous peoples and the Constitution; the 
Constitution Act, 1867; prisons and punishment; fundamental freedoms; Mr. Big and developments 
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The starting point is the Supreme Court’s output in the calendar year. 
The SCC website reports 79 decisions in 2014, of which 18 — or about 
22 per cent — are anchored in the Constitution.28 It is reassuring to note 
that the numbers and percentages square generally with the pattern of 
recent years.29 As well, by claiming 12 of 18 — a two-thirds share of the 
total — the Charter once again dominated the jurisprudence. At 16 per cent, 
the 2014 success rate on Charter claims aligns with outcomes in the last 
five years: 15 per cent in 2013; 20 per cent in 2012; 18 per cent in 2011; and 
18 per cent in 2010.30 Though a rate in the 15-20 per cent range is stable, it is 
easy to forget that Charter claims attained a success rate, on average, of  
45 per cent per year in the first 10 years of the McLachlin Court.31  
The Court’s output on rights in 2014 disappoints because it failed to 
yield a landmark that notably advanced or affected the Charter’s 
interpretation.32 Criminal justice accounts for nine of 12 cases and 11 arose 
under the Charter’s legal rights, leaving one orphan under section 2(d).33 
                                                                                                                       
in police powers; and constitutional justice in the “longue durée”. Their papers are published in this 
volume of the Supreme Court Law Review. 
28 <https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/2014/nav_date.do>. 
29 In 2013, 11 of 74 cases, or about 15 per cent, were constitutional cases; in 2012, the 
number was 11 of 75, and also about 15 per cent; and in 2011, the number was 19 out of 75, or about 
20 per cent of the annual jurisprudence. The year 2010 stands out, because 25 of the Court’s 67 
decisions, or about 37 per cent, addressed constitutional issues. See generally, J. Cameron, 
“The McLachlin Court and the Charter in 2012”, supra, note 11, at 20-23 (discussing the data over 
the years); and S. Lawrence, “2013: Constitutional Cases in Review” in J. Cameron, B.L. Berger &  
S. Lawrence, eds., Constitutional Cases 2013 (2014) 67 S.C.L.R. (2d) 1, at 3-4 (providing 2013 data). 
30 Cameron, id., at 20-21. 
31 Cameron, id., at 20 (citing P. Monahan & J. Yap, “Constitutional Cases 2009: An Overview”, 
in J. Cameron & B. Ryder, eds., Constitutional Cases 2009, (2010) 51 S.C.L.R. (2d) 3, at 3). 
32 But see Spencer, infra, note 33 (finding a reasonable expectation of privacy in Internet 
subscriber information); Fearon, infra, note 33 (addressing cell phone privacy rights); see also Hart, 
infra, note 46 (non-Charter decision placing restrictions on “Mr. Big” police operations). For 
comment in this volume, see N. Hasan, “A Step Forward or Just a Sidestep? Year Five of the 
Supreme Court of Canada in the Digital Age”; and S. Magotiaux, “Out of Sync: Section 8 and 
Technological Advancement in Supreme Court Jurisprudence”. 
33 The criminal cases are: R. v. MacDonald, [2014] S.C.J. No. 3, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 37 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “MacDonald”]; R. v. Babos, [2014] S.C.J. No. 16, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 309 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Babos”]; Canada (Attorney General) v. Whaling, [2014] S.C.J. No. 20, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 392 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Whaling”]; R. v. Mian, [2014] S.C.J. No. 54, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 689 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Mian”]; R. v. Anderson, [2014] S.C.J. No. 41, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 167 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Anderson”]; 
R. v. Spencer, [2014] S.C.J. No. 43, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 212 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Spencer”] R. v. 
Conception, [2014] S.C.J. No. 60, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 82 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Conception”]; Wakeling v. 
United States of America, [2014] S.C.J. No. 72, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 549 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Wakeling”] 
and R. v. Fearon, [2014] S.C.J. No. 77, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 621 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Fearon”]. 
The two non-criminal legal rights cases are Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Harkat, [2014] 
S.C.J. No. 37, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 33 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Harkat”] (s. 7); and Kazemi Estate v. Islamic 
Republic of Iran, [2014] S.C.J. No. 62, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 176 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Kazemi Estate”] (s. 7). 
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Though the claim prevailed twice, under sections 11(h) and 10(h), neither 
success was weighty. While Whaling invalidated part of the government’s 
get-tough policy on sentencing, the retrospective alteration of parole 
entitlements did not require interpretive finesse, and Mian found a 
section 10(b) violation but was more concerned with the scope of 
appellate review.34 Other claims either failed or acknowledged the 
Charter violation without excluding illegally obtained evidence.35  
The prevalence of legal rights obscured other entitlements that 
played little or no role in the 2014 jurisprudence. The demoralization of 
section 15 has been lamented for some time, and the equality guarantee again 
failed to generate a precedent.36 A further concern is that section 2(b) — 
which was also absent in 2014 — might be about to join section 15 in 
decline.37 If the Charter’s first 30 years attest that lulls in jurisprudential 
activity can be expected, it is worth remembering that these guarantees had 
enormous vitality in the formative years. Despite maintaining a healthy 
presence on the docket for some time, equality and expressive freedom have 
become less relevant in the current jurisprudence. Though section 15’s status 
has been noted and discussed with concern, section 2(b)’s low profile has 
not attracted much attention. Given the pattern, it may not be premature to 
ask whether the jurisprudence is trending in a way that reflects core 
perceptions about the Charter’s long-term mandate, or more accurately 
represents a passing dynamic grounded in a political focus on criminal 
justice, and the judiciary’s response to that priority. The question, in other 
words, is whether the Court is as passive as the Chief Justice suggested, or 
has played a role in placing these guarantees in the background.38  
                                                                                                                       
Bernard v. Canada (Attorney General), [2014] S.C.J. No. 13, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 227 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Bernard”], was the only case in 2014 that fell outside ss. 7-14 of the Charter. 
34 See H. Stewart, “Punitive in Effect: Reflections on Canada v. Whaling” (in this volume). 
35 Spencer and Fearon, supra, note 33 (not excluding evidence obtained in violation of s. 8). 
36 Though argued in the courts below, the s. 15 claim in Anderson, supra, note 33, was 
abandoned at the Supreme Court of Canada; see also Carter, supra, note 8, at para. 93 (declining to 
address s. 15 issues that received full attention in the courts below). 
37 Section 2(b) failed to generate a decision in 2014; before then the claim succeeded once in 
Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v. United Food and Commercial Workers, Local 401, 
[2013] S.C.J. No. 62, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 733 (S.C.C.) (protecting picket line expressive activity) and 
otherwise substantially failed in Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v. Whatcott, [2013] S.C.J. 
No. 11, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 467 (S.C.C.) (upholding limits on anti-gay expressive activity) and R. v. 
Khawaja, [2012] S.C.J. No. 69, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 555 (S.C.C.) (rejecting s. 2 challenges to the definition 
of “terrorist activity”). See also B. (A.) v. Bragg Communications, Inc., [2012] S.C.J. No. 46, [2012] 2 
S.C.R. 567 (S.C.C.) (anonymizing the plaintiff’s name and denying the request for a publication ban). 
38 An answer requires more rigorous investigation. Still, it is worth noting that the Court 
recently refused leave to appeal in two notable cases under ss. 2 and 15: McAteer v. Canada (Attorney 
General), [2014] O.J. No. 3728, 2014 ONCA 578 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2014] S.C.C.A. 
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If the Charter jurisprudence is modest, what sets the 2014 
constitutional calendar apart are the Court’s non-Charter cases. 
Six decisions on federalism, national institutions and Aboriginal rights 
accounted for about 31 per cent of the Court’s constitutional decision-
making.39 The Supreme Court’s Reference decisions on Supreme Court 
appointments and Senate reform addressed the constitutional status of 
national institutions and provided critical guidance on the requirements 
of constitutional change.40 Then Tsilhqot’in Nation’s altered the law on 
Aboriginal title and proactively created a framework to regulate land 
use.41 Almost any attempt to capture the significance of these decisions 
and the Court’s profile in the early months of 2014 would be inadequate. 
Later in the year, Trial Lawyers marked another significant departure 
when the Court deployed the division of powers to constitutionalize 
access to justice.42 Though less newsworthy, the Court’s decision to  
limit provincial jurisdiction by embedding that entitlement in  
section 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867 — in reliance on unwritten 
constitutional principles — was a major decision, doctrinally and 
jurisprudentially.43 Grassy Narrows was a second Aboriginal decision in 
                                                                                                                       
No. 444 (S.C.C.) (s. 2 challenge to the citizenship oath to the Queen); and Tanudjaja v. Canada 
(Attorney General), [2014] O.J. No. 5689, 2014 ONCA 852 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2015] 
S.C.C.A. No. 39 (S.C.C.) (economic rights for homeless persons under ss. 7 and 15). 
39 Non-Charter cases fluctuate from year to year and are not usually a defining feature of 
the annual docket: for instance, there was one Aboriginal and one federalism case in 2013; one 
division of powers decision in 2012; and two division of powers and one Aboriginal decision in 
2011. In 2010 there were four division of powers decisions and three on Aboriginal issues. 
In 2014, see the Appointment Reference, supra, note 4; the Senate Reference, supra, note 4; 
Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra, note 5; Grassy Narrows First Nation v. Ontario (Natural Resources), 
[2014] S.C.J. No. 48, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 447 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Grassy Narrows”]; Bank of 
Montreal v. Marcotte, [2014] S.C.J. No. 55, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 725 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Marcotte”]; 
and Trial Lawyers, supra, note 5. 
40 In this volume see R. Haigh, “You Don’t Need a Metaphor to Know Which Way the 
Case Goes: The Senate Reference and Constitutional Metaphors”; C. Mathen, “The Shadow of 
Absurdity and the Challenge of Easy Cases: Looking Back on the Supreme Court Act Reference”. 
41 See A. Boisselle, “To Dignity Through the Backdoor: Tsilhqot’in and the ‘Aboriginal 
Title’ Test”; J. Borrows, “Aboriginal Title and Private Property”; K. McNeil, “Aboriginal Title and 
the Provinces After Tsilhqot’in Nation”; and B. Slattery, “The Constitutional Dimensions of 
Aboriginal Title” (all this volume). 
42 Trial Lawyers relied on the division of powers and unwritten principles — the rule of law — 
to invalidate hearing fees under s. 96 because they infringe the core jurisdiction of the courts by 
denying individuals access to justice. Chief Justice McLachlin held that “[a]s access to justice is 
fundamental to the rule of law, and the rule of law is fostered by the continued existence of the s. 96 
courts, it is only natural that s. 96 provide some degree of protection for access to justice”. Trial 
Lawyers, supra, note 5, at para. 39. 
43 See Rothstein J. (arguing, in dissent, that “[i]n using an unwritten principle to support 
expanding the ambit of s. 96 to such an extent, the majority subverts the structure of the Constitution 
and jeopardizes the primacy of the written text”); id., at para. 93. 
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which the claim failed, and a trio of banking cases from Quebec — in 
which the claim also failed — rounded out 2014’s constitutional 
decisions.44  
Overall, a quantitative survey of 2014 confirms that while the Court was 
active on constitutional issues, the Charter essentially marked time. As 
noted, the numbers provide little indication that 2014 was a year quite unlike 
any other. Yet the institutional decisions on the Supreme Court and Senate 
were not just constitutionally dramatic but politically seismic as well. The 
springtime Reference decisions dealt the federal government setbacks that 
triggered a shocking and unprecedented political attack on the Chief Justice 
and her Court. On May 1, 2014, the Prime Minister and Minister of Justice 
publicly impugned McLachlin C.J.C.’s integrity in a way that was almost 
universally dismissed as shabby, unwarranted and unstatesmanlike.45 The 
attack had profound consequences for the Court and government, and a 
public unaccustomed to such a lack of courtesy in institutional dealings.  
It is also necessary, methodologically, to contextualize the quantitative 
survey in other ways. First, a straight tally treats decisions of wildly varying 
significance as equals; though each counts as one, it is obvious to all that the 
Court’s 2014 constitutional decisions handily eclipsed its developments 
under the Charter. Additionally, a formal count also excludes “near” 
constitutional cases, which address doctrinal protections that are not 
formally decided under the Charter.46 Imperative in any review of the 2014 
jurisprudence is R. v. Hart and the restrictions the Court placed on “Mr. Big” 
operations. Though assigned, in doctrinal terms, to the common law 
of confessions, Hart implicates the right to silence and freedom from  
                                                                                                                       
44 The Quebec trilogy on banking counts as one decision, in this survey, because Marcotte 
provided the key discussion on the constitutional issue. See also Amex Bank of Canada v. Adams, 
[2014] S.C.J. No. 56, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 787 (S.C.C.); Marcotte v. Fédération des caisses Desjardins 
du Québec, [2014] S.C.J. No. 57, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 805 (S.C.C.). For a comment in this volume see 
W. Wright, “Of Banks, Federalism and Clear Statement Rules: Bank of Montreal v. Marcotte”. 
45 There is an enormous online commentary on all aspects of the Nadon appointment; see 
generally, Sossin, “Court Dismissed”, supra, note 4. 
46 While surveys in the past may have included decisions on Charter values and common 
law “rights”, the 2014 overview does not. Decisions of note include R. v. Hart, [2014] S.C.J.  
No. 52, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 544 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hart”] and R. v. Mack, [2014] S.C.J. No. 58, 
[2014] 3 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Mack”] (“Mr. Big” operations, confessions, and self 
incrimination); R. v. Clarke, [2014] S.C.J. No. 100, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 612 (S.C.C.) (Charter values 
argued but not engaged); R. v. Quesnelle, [2014] S.C.J. No. 46, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 390 (S.C.C.) (Mills 
and Criminal Code disclosure regimes); Mission Institution v. Khela, [2014] S.C.J. No. 24, [2014] 1 
S.C.R. 502 (S.C.C.) (habeas corpus and procedural fairness in a prison setting); and R. v. 
Summers, [2014] S.C.J. No. 26, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 575 (S.C.C.) (reading provisions in the Truth in 
Sentencing Act, S.C. 2009, c. 29 against principles of sentencing). 
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self-incrimination under section 7, as attested by a concurring opinion, 
which would have anchored limits on these tactics in the Charter.47  
Finally, the Court’s tsunami of Charter decisions in early 2015 
pointed up another limit of the calendar approach. In the period from 
January 1 to the Charter’s anniversary on April 17, 2015, the Court 
released 15 decisions, of which eight — or more than 50 per cent — 
arose under the Constitution.48 During this whirlwind, the Charter claim 
succeeded in six instances, or about 85 per cent of the cases, and lost 
only once. Though decision-making has settled, the pattern continued 
with the release of other significant decisions in spring 2015.49 
The 2014 overview should not overreach its mandate, but nor can it 
ignore the extraordinary flow of constitutional decisions early in 2015. 
That flow especially points up the folly of surveying a jurisprudence 
that simply is not oriented to the calendar year. Showcasing or 
overvaluing annual numbers is somewhat arbitrary and can encourage 
misleading or inaccurate impressions. The Court’s decision-making is 
seamless, and a meaningful commentary must acknowledge its burst of 
Charter decisions at the outset of 2015. Doing so shows quite clearly 
that, far from being a disappointment, the Charter jurisprudence arising 
from the 2014 docket was strong and in some instances even 
transformative.  
From any perspective, 2015’s early returns are remarkable. With an 
ongoing exception for section 2(b), the Court restored section 2’s 
freedoms (of religion and association) to a place of stature in the  
 
                                                                                                                       
47 Justice Karakatsanis, concurring. On any view, Hart, id., is a landmark, despite 
differences of opinion about whether it should have been decided under the Charter or the  law 
of confessions. For comments in this volume, see S. Coughlan, “Threading Together Abuse of 
Process and Exclusion of Evidence: How it Became Possible to Rebuke Mr. Big”;  
L. Dufraimont, “Hart and Mack: New Restraints on Mr. Big and a New Approach to Unreliable 
Prosecution Evidence”. 
48 The Court decided seven Charter cases between January 1 and the anniversary of the 
Charter on April 17, 2015; the claim only failed once, in Meredith v. Canada (Attorney General), 
and the eighth decision concerned the status of the federal Gun Registry and whether Quebec was 
constitutionally entitled to have access to the registry information. See Mounted Police, supra, 
note 8; Meredith v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015] S.C.J. No. 2, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 125 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Meredith”]; and SFL, supra, note 8 (“the 2015 Labour Trilogy”); Carter, supra, 
note 8 (assisted suicide under s. 7); Federation of Law Societies of Canada, supra, note 9 (s. 7); 
Loyola High School, supra, note 9 (s. 2(a)); and Nur, supra, note 9 (s. 12). See also Quebec 
(Attorney General) v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015] S.C.J. No. 14, 2015 SCC 14 (S.C.C.) 
(constitutional access to the Gun Registry database) [hereinafter “Gun Registry case”]. 
49 To the end of April, see also Mouvement laïque québécois, supra, note 9 (municipal prayer 
and human rights legislation); and Association des parents, supra, note 9 (minority language rights). 
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jurisprudence, invalidated Criminal Code provisions, challenged the 
current government’s criminal justice policy, and reactivated minority 
language rights. Three of the Court’s landmarks in this period — namely, 
Mounted Police, SFL and Carter — blasted long-standing authority on 
labour relations and prohibitions on assisted suicide. Early in January, the 
Court overruled precedent to grant Mounted Police the constitutional 
right to engage in meaningful collective bargaining.50 Within weeks, the 
Court overruled precedent of 28 years’ standing and proclaimed a 
constitutional benediction for the right to strike in SFL.51 Finally, the full 
Court unanimously invalidated sections 14 and 241 of the Criminal Code 
only a few months after hearing the appeal.52 Unlike the labour cases, 
Carter v. Canada purported not to overrule Rodriguez v. British 
Columbia, and did so in unattributed or anonymous reasons by “the 
Court”.53 Not to be overlooked in this mix are further decisions 
protecting solicitor-client privilege under section 7, exempting a 
denominational school from provincial curriculum requirements, 
invalidating a mandatory minimum for firearms offences, and finding 
that municipal prayer violates human rights legislation.54 Separately and 
in combination, inspired decision-making brought fresh energy to the 
Court’s interpretation of the Charter.  
It is difficult to recall another period when the McLachlin Court 
asserted itself in this way, with strong and confident decisions across a 
range of issues. Justice LeBel’s retirement and looming departure from 
the Court was a factor in the “hurry up” manner of 2015 decision-
making, but does not fully explain the enormity — and even the air of 
urgency — of what court watchers witnessed at the beginning of the year. 
                                                                                                                       
50 Supra, note 8 (overruling Delisle v. Canada (Attorney General), [1999] S.C.J. No. 43, 
[1999] 2 S.C.R. 989 (S.C.C.) and “explaining” Ontario (Attorney General) v. Fraser, [2011] S.C.J. 
No. 20, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Fraser”]). 
51 SFL, supra, note 8, at para. 3 (overruling Reference re Public Service Employee Relations 
Act (Alberta), [1987] S.C.J. No. 10, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313 (S.C.C.)). In this volume, see M. Dunn, 
“Many Questions and a Few Answers: Freedom of Association after Saskatchewan Federation of 
Labour, Mounted Police, and Meredith”. 
52 The appeal was heard on October 15, 2014 and decided with alacrity on February 6, 2015. 
53 Unlike Mounted Police and SFL, which explicitly overruled precedent to the contrary, 
Carter “distinguished” Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] S.C.J. No. 94, 
[1993] 3 S.C.R. 519 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Rodriguez”] (upholding the same Criminal Code 
provision). 
54 Federation of Law Societies, Loyola High School and Nur, supra, note 9. For a comment 
on Loyola High School in this volume, see H. Kislowicz, “Loyola High School v. Attorney General 
of Quebec: On Non-triviality and the Charter Value of Religious Freedom”. 
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III. THE SUPREME COURT CAST 
A scan of authorship in Supreme Court decision-making demonstrates, 
albeit with some judges more active than others, that writing assignments 
were well distributed. Before turning to the judges themselves, 
preliminary observations can be made. The first is that, in practical 
terms, the McLachlin Court was profoundly affected by the prolonged 
controversy surrounding Justice Nadon’s appointment.55 The Court was 
short-staffed and unable to sit as a panel of nine from October 2013 to 
June 2014, with the result that only one case was decided by all members 
of the Court. By early 2015, a full Court participated in three of the 
Court’s eight Charter decisions, with the balance in this period decided 
by seven or eight-member panels.56 
A second preliminary observation is that unanimity is often 
considered an important sign of the Court’s collegiality, solidarity, and 
functioning. In 2014, 10 of its 18 constitutional decisions, or about 
55 per cent, were unanimous on outcome and were accompanied, in two 
instances, by concurring reasons.57 Meanwhile, at close to 45 per cent, 
the incidence of dissent provided a visible and healthy sign of 
disagreement among the judges on difficult issues.58 The only unanimous 
                                                                                                                       
55 Justice Fish retired on August 31, 2013, and was replaced by Nadon J., whose 
appointment was announced on September 30, 2013. Despite being sworn in on October 7, 2013, 
Nadon J. never sat as a member of the Supreme Court of Canada, and was barred from the Supreme 
Court building once his appointment was challenged and the federal government stated reference 
questions to the Court. Justice Fish’s place at the Court was vacant, as a result, for almost a year — 
from August 2013 to June 12, 2014 — when Gascon J. was appointed to the Court. The Court’s 
website has removed any and all references to Nadon J. 
56 Of the cases decided in the 2014 calendar year, only R. v. Conception was heard by nine 
judges, and that is because it was “re-heard” after Gascon J. was appointed. In early 2015, Carter, 
the Gun Registry case and Nur were heard and decided by the full Court. In 2014, the Senate 
Reference, Tsilhqot’in Nation, Whaling, Harkat and Spencer were heard by a panel of eight judges, 
and the balance of the constitutional decisions were heard by a panel of seven judges; in 2015, the 
2015 Labour Trilogy, Federation of Law Societies, and Loyola High School were decided by seven-
member panels. 
57 The unanimous decisions are the Senate Reference, Bank of Montreal v. Marcotte, 
Tsilhqot’in Nation, Grassy Narrows, Whaling, Anderson, Spencer and Mian; concurring reasons 
accompanied the majority opinion in Conception and MacDonald. There were concurring and 
dissenting reasons in Trial Lawyers and Wakeling. 
58 For dissenting reasons see the Appointment Reference (per Moldaver J.); Trial Lawyers 
(per Rothstein J.); Bernard (partial dissent) (per Rothstein J., Moldaver J. concurring); Babos (per 
Abella J.); Harkat (per Abella and Cromwell JJ.); Kazemi Estate (per Abella J.); Wakeling (per 
Karakatsanis J., Abella and Cromwell JJ., concurring); and Fearon (per Karakatsanis J., LeBel and 
Abella JJ., concurring). The Court divided 4-3 in Wakeling and Fearon; Justice Abella dissented 
alone in Babos and Kazemi Estate; Rothstein J.’s sole dissent was Trial Lawyers and Moldaver J.’s 
was the Appointment Reference. 
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opinion in early 2015 was Carter v. Canada, though the Court’s majority 
opinions in Federation of Law Societies, Loyola High School and 
Mouvement laïque québécois were supplemented by concurring reasons. 
Notably, four of the Court’s eight cases up to the Charter’s 2015 
anniversary — or 50 per cent — yielded pointed dissenting opinions in 
the three section 2(d) labour relations cases, as well as in the Gun 
Registry case, which was decided by a 5-4 margin, before Nur again 
divided the Court by a vote of 6-3.  
A third observation concerns the Court’s anonymous reasons in both 
References and Carter. The Senate Reference was unanimous but the 
Appointment Reference was not, and though there is precedent for it, still 
it is unusual for the Court to anonymize majority reasons when the panel 
is not unanimous.59 In addition, the full Court’s decision on assisted 
suicide in Carter was also anonymous. It is often thought that the Court 
elects to speak anonymously, and as one, on issues of institutional 
delicacy; classic examples include the Patriation and Secession 
References.60 Even so it is puzzling that anonymous reasons by “the 
Court” attract so little attention and the practice is accepted virtually 
without comment.61 Though it could be argued that a decision by “the 
Court” is appropriate for so-called “advisory opinions”, it is not self-
evident that the same rationale applies to ordinary appeals. Nor does the 
controversy associated with particular decisions explain why some 
decisions, but not others, are singled out for institutional authorship.62 
Solidarity for solidarity’s sake is not a convincing rationale in a case like 
Carter.63 Though unanimity might boost the legitimacy, credibility and 
authority of a decision, it is not clear the same applies to anonymous 
                                                                                                                       
59 See, e.g., Re Resolution to amend the Constitution, [1981] S.C.J. No. 58, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 
753 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Patriation Reference”] (majority and minority reasons on the legal and 
constitutional issues which listed the judges concurring in each opinion but not the author); Irwin 
Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 (reasons by “the Court” represented a 
majority of three on a panel of five judges deciding the case). 
60 The Patriation Reference, id.; Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] S.C.J. No. 61, 
[1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Secession Reference”]. 
61 But see P. McCormick & M. Zanoni, “The First ‘By the Court’ Decisions: The 
Emergence of a Practice at the Supreme Court of Canada” (forthcoming, Manitoba Law Journal; 
draft on file with the author). Professor McCormick advises that he has a book on topic, to be 
published by University of Toronto Press. 
62 Compare Bedford and Insite, (both authored by the Chief Justice) and the Court’s 
two decisions in Khadr (authored by “the Court”); supra, note 10. 
63 The Court’s decision in Carter was particularly lacking in decision-making transparency: 
not only did the judges fail to identify the opinion’s author or authors, it claimed — without 
credibility — that Carter did not overrule Rodriguez, supra, note 53, in which then Justice 
McLachlin wrote a prominent dissenting opinion. 
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decision writing. The Court’s reasons for decision are one of the few 
sources of transparency and accountability in its work, and the authors of 
decisions that become the supreme law of the land should be disclosed, 
not withheld.64 At the least, the practice and purpose of anonymous 
decision-making at the Supreme Court should be placed under closer 
analytical scrutiny.  
Also noteworthy over the years is the McLachlin Court’s regularization 
and institutionalization of teamwork in the form of joint opinions.65  
Shared responsibility for reasons has become an accepted practice at the 
Court, as the following writing teams in this period demonstrate: 
McLachlin-LeBel and McLachlin-Moldaver; Abella-Cromwell; Rothstein-
Moldaver, Rothstein-Wagner and Rothstein-Cromwell; Moldaver-Wagner; 
and Cromwell-Karakatsanis.66 The most notable instance of joint authorship 
may be the Gun Registry case, where the three judges from Quebec 
dissented jointly and in unison from the majority opinion rejecting the 
province’s claim of constitutional access to the long gun registry database.67 
Otherwise, pairings that were frequent and at times unexpected — such as 
the two joint concurrences by the Chief Justice and Moldaver J. — may 
have enabled the judges to manage the workload for an extended period 
when the Court was not at full complement.  
The Chief Justice wrote five times in constitutional cases decided in 
2014: twice the Court was unanimous; twice she held a majority; and 
once she wrote a sole concurrence.68 She also joined Justice 
Karakatsanis’s concurrence in Conception, but neither wrote nor 
participated in a dissent in this period. To her 2014 landmarks in 
Tsilhqot’in Nation and Trial Lawyers, the Chief Justice added Mounted 
Police and Nur early in 2015. In doing so, she continued her practice of 
                                                                                                                       
64 The Court’s commitment to public access to its processes and hearings is commendable. 
The many resources that are available can be found at the Supreme Court of Canada website: 
<http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/>. 
65 See P. McCormick, “Sharing the Spotlight: Co-authored Reasons on the Modern 
Supreme Court of Canada” (2011) 34 Dal. L.J. 165. 
66 The Chief Justice wrote joint reasons with LeBel J. in Mounted Police and Meredith, and 
with Moldaver J. in Law Societies and Loyola. Justice Cromwell wrote a joint dissent with Abella J. 
in Harkat, a joint majority opinion with Rothstein J. in Conception, and a joint majority opinion with 
Karakatsanis J. in the Gun Registry case; Justice Rothstein additionally teamed up with Moldaver J. 
in partial dissent in Bernard, and with Wagner J. in dissent in SFL; and Justices Moldaver and 
Wagner co-wrote the majority opinion in MacDonald. 
67 Justice Abella joined the dissent, which resulted in a 5-4 division on the Court. 
68 Her unanimous decisions were Tsilhqot’in Nation and Grassy Narrows; her majority 
opinions were Harkat and Trial Lawyers; and her sole concurrence was Wakeling. 
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co-writing with LeBel J. in two of the Court’s 2015 labour relations 
decisions.69 
With all puisne judges playing an active role in decision-making, 
2014 was a year of relative balance in judicial voice, though some 
members of the Court were more visible than others. Justice Abella had 
just one joint majority opinion, and otherwise made her mark in 
dissenting and joint dissenting reasons.70 Already she has played a 
prominent role in 2015’s Charter cases with a solo dissent in Meredith, 
the majority opinions in SFL and Loyola High School, and concurring 
reasons in Mouvement laïque québécois. 
While Rothstein J. had two majority opinions, one dissent, and a 
partial joint dissent, Cromwell J. wrote four majority opinions, one 
concurrence, and one joint dissent.71 In 2015, Rothstein J. engaged 
actively on labour relations issues, and Cromwell J. co-wrote Gun 
Registry’s majority opinion. Meantime, Moldaver J. had four majority 
opinions (including Hart and Mack, the Court’s non-Charter Mr. Big 
cases), one concurrence, and a singular dissent in the Appointment 
Reference; in 2015 he wrote joint concurring opinions in Law Societies 
and Loyola, and a biting dissent in Nur.72 
The Court’s most senior puisne judge, LeBel J., who retired on 
November 30, 2014, wrote two majority opinions and teamed up with the 
Chief Justice in two of 2015’s labour trilogy decisions.73 Justice 
Karakatsanis did not have a majority opinion in 2014, but wrote two 
concurrences and two dissents of significance, before co-authoring the 
                                                                                                                       
69 Mounted Police, supra, note 8 and Meredith, supra, note 48. For earlier joint opinions on 
labour relations issues by this team, see RWDSU, Local 558 v. Pepsi Cola Canada Beverages (West) 
Ltd., [2002] S.C.J. No. 7, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 156 (S.C.C.) (secondary picketing); Health Services and 
Support — Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia, supra, note 10; and Ontario 
(Attorney General) v. Fraser, supra, note 50. Justices Rothstein and Abella were also active in this 
trio of cases, as they have been on these issues in the past. Justice Rothstein wrote a strong 
concurrence in Fraser, which read more like a dissent, and Abella J. dissented in the same case on 
the outcome. While Justice Rothstein wrote to minimize the constitutionalization of labour relations, 
Abella J., wrote in the opposite direction, to maximize the scope of s. 2(d). 
70 The majority opinion was Bernard (joint opinion with Cromwell J.); the dissents were 
Babos and Kazemi Estate; and the joint dissent was Harkat (joint opinion). 
71 Justice Rothstein’s majority opinions were Mian and Conception (joint opinion with 
Cromwell J.); he dissented in Trial Lawyers and co-wrote a partial dissent with Moldaver J. in 
Bernard. Justice Cromwell’s majority opinions were Spencer, Fearon, Bernard (with Abella J.), and 
Conception (with Rothstein J.); his concurrence was Trial Lawyers and his dissent was Harkat (with 
Abella J.). Justice Cromwell also wrote a concurring opinion in Hart. 
72 The Moldaver J. majority opinions were Babos, Anderson, Mack and Hart; his 
concurrences, were MacDonald (Wagner J.), and Law Societies and Loyola High School (Chief 
Justice McLachlin). 
73 Justice LeBel’s majority opinions in 2014 were MacDonald and Kazemi Estate. 
(2015) 71 S.C.L.R. (2d) LAW, POLITICS AND LEGACY BUILDING 19 
majority opinion in the Gun Registry case in 2015.74 Justice Wagner 
wrote twice, both times for a majority of the Court, and Gascon J.’s debut 
on the rights docket held that a prayer exercise in public municipal 
meetings violated Quebec’s human rights legislation.75 
To summarize, the survey reveals a functional balance between 
consensus and voice in decision writing at the McLachlin Court. Though 
the Chief Justice lauds it as a leadership priority, too much consensus is 
undesirable and can blunt the sharper edges of debate on difficult matters 
of constitutional policy.76 That said, and against a current of unanimity — 
which was notable in the Aboriginal cases, the Senate Reference, and 
Carter — the jurisprudence produced significant dissents and valuable 
concurrences. That is reassuring, because it is through the engagement of 
argument and divergent points of view that the law’s capacity for growth is 
best realized. Unanimity should not be overvalued at the expense of 
concurrences and dissents that, in most instances, enrich the jurisprudence 
and add to, rather than detract from, the Court’s legitimacy.77 
IV. LEGACY BUILDING 
By self-declaration Chief Justice McLachlin is not a legacy builder. 
For her, decision-making is not a matter of strategy or design, but instead 
describes a process of case-specific moments in which “conscious 
objectivity” joins fairness with human context to determine what justice 
                                                                                                                       
74 The concurrences were Hart and Conception; the dissents were Wakeling and Fearon. 
See S. Kari, “Carving out a Profile,” Canadian Lawyer (April 2015), at 26-31 (discussing 
Karakatsanis J.’s decisions and their influence). For a comment on R. v. Conception in this volume, 
see S. Fraser, “Hospital Knows Best: Court and Unfit Accused at the Mercy of Hospital 
Administrators – The Case of R. v. Conception”. 
75 Justice Wagner’s majority opinions were MacDonald (with Moldaver J.), and Wakeling; 
Justice Gascon’s was Mouvement laïque québécois. 
76 As noted above, the Chief Justice supports a process of decision-making that is aimed at 
eliminating “unnecessary voices” and “unnecessary concurrences”; supra, note 12. Further 
indication that consensus is at the core of her leadership is found in the following remarks, made in 
2010: “[t]he Court’s work in the last ten years has been marked by a high degree of consensus. … In 
the first year I was chief justice, consensus peaked at 82% — that is, in 82% of the cases were 
unanimous in the result. Unfortunately, the stats have been somewhat downhill from then on.” 
(emphasis added) The Rt. Hon. Beverley McLachlin, P.C., “The First Decade of the 21st Century: 
The Supreme Court of Canada in Context”, in D. Wright & A. Dodek, eds., Public Law at the 
McLachlin Court: The First Decade (Toronto: Irwin Law Inc., 2011), Foreword. 
77 See, e.g., W.D. Rankin & M. Jamal, “Dissents and Concurrences: Seven Debates in 
Charter Jurisprudence” in B.L. Berger, J. Cameron & S. Lawrence, eds., Constitutional Cases 2012, 
supra, note 11, at 89. 
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demands in any given setting.78 The jurisprudence that emerges is a 
fortuitous mix of whatever appeals are presented to the Court at any 
time; under this iteration, any legacy created in this way is incidental, 
and serendipitous. 
2014 was nonetheless a legacy year for the McLachlin Court of 
political and legal or constitutional dimensions, which are interlocking but 
play distinctive roles in the narrative. To explain, deteriorating relations 
between the Court and federal leadership made 2014 a year of high profile 
and high stakes decision-making. The attack on the Chief Justice in spring 
2014 was a purely political act and an attempt to politicize the Chief 
Justice, undermine her authority, and cast a dark shadow on the Court. 
Though relatively short-lived, the direct attack unquestionably placed the 
Court in crisis. Both before and after the crisis, the judges delivered a 
sharp and assertive series of decisions on constitutional law and Charter 
rights. Of interest in these dynamics is the interface between the political 
and legal, and — more to the point — the impact of politics on the law in a 
year of milestone decisions. The question, then, is whether the Court 
simply assumed a dutiful and unconcerned posture in decision-making — 
much in the way the Chief Justice describes her own objectives — or, in 
the face of challenges to its authority and the authority of the law, chose 
instead to assert its institutional power and shape a legacy.  
Surviving the political attack and consolidating its position in 
Canadian political life are central elements of the Court’s legacy in 2014. 
When the Prime Minister and Minister of Justice picked a public fight 
with the Chief Justice, there was little she and her Court could do to 
respond publicly. Chief Justice McLachlin had no choice but to answer 
the serious allegations against her, but more generally the Court is 
powerless to defend itself from unfair accusations and commentary.79 
Even so, the Court and Chief Justice emerged from the Nadon 
appointment crisis and its aftermath relatively unscathed. By most 
accounts, the challenge to her integrity was a foolish and impulsive 
gamble that did more to reinforce than damage the Chief Justice’s 
reputation. It was widely seen as a base and unsophisticated move to 
                                                                                                                       
78 As she explained, judgment is “not a coldly neutral evaluation of competing positions, 
robotically free of compassion or perspective” but “an engaged, human act of imagination”. Under 
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looks like from their perspective, and really think about it, not just give it lip service”. Brean, 
“Conscious Objectivity”, supra, note 12. 
79 S. Fine, “Chief Justice hits back at prime minister over claim of improper call”, The  
Globe and Mail (May 2, 2014), online: <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/chief-
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undermine the Supreme Court — understood by the government as an 
adversary — by attacking Chief Justice McLachlin personally. The 
allegations were thought transparently without merit, and the campaign 
not only backfired but arguably strengthened and consolidated the 
legitimacy of the Court and Chief Justice.80  
Attention on the Court was constant in this period. Whether the 
judges might deal the government further setbacks and how the 
government might respond to a feisty Court were ongoing themes in a 
news environment that feasted on the prospect of ongoing institutional 
conflict. Headlines with a thirst for controversy spoke of the Court as 
“the government’s nemesis”, named the Chief Justice as the true “leader 
of the opposition”, described the government’s “potshots” at the Court, 
and dwelled on the “political firestorm” and “cold legal war”.81 
Throughout, it was not the manner of this discourse to defuse, but instead 
to heighten and highlight the sense of a contest between the Court and 
the political leadership.82 In this process the Court and Chief Justice 
                                                                                                                       
80 See generally J. Ivison, “Tories incensed with Supreme Court as some allege Chief 
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absorbed some heat, in the form of renewed complaints about Canada’s 
“judicial oligarchy”, and dissent from the “ever-rising hallelujah chorus 
of adulation being orchestrated by and for the chief justice”.83 This spring 
McLachlin C.J.C. was chastised for naming Canada’s treatment of 
Aboriginals “cultural genocide”.84 The Court unquestionably has 
detractors and critics who can and should question the exercise of its 
powers, especially in light of the recent jurisprudence. Still, there has as 
yet been no groundswell of opposition to the Court. Instead, the appetite-
whetting “dialogue” — or shouting match, as some might say — 
between institutions and institutional leaders has served immeasurably to 
raise the profile of the Court and its Chief Justice.85 
The furor surrounding Supreme Court appointments, the attack on the 
Chief Justice, and the climate of institutional hostility also has an inside 
story. Though this story is closely held between members of the Court, there 
can be no doubt that the roiling events around Supreme Court appointments 
had an impact on the Chief Justice and the judges. From one perspective, the 
quantitative survey can support a conclusion that these dynamics did little to 
ruffle the Court because the annual numbers and results are in line with the 
general pattern of recent years. But as shown here, the Court produced a 
legacy-setting jurisprudence in this period — before and after the 
appointment controversy — which features constitutional and Charter 
milestones. To be sure, there is a sense of the federal government driving the 
agenda, not only by stating reference questions the Court was required to 
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answer but, as well, by pressing criminal justice policies in the undoubted 
knowledge that at least some would run afoul of the Charter. Those 
dynamics do not tell all because decisions such as Tsilhqot’in Nation, Trial 
Lawyers, SFL, and the religious freedom cases involved challenges to 
legislation and actions at the provincial level. Nor can serendipity explain 
this year’s legacy jurisprudence: apart from references and appeals as of 
right the Court chooses its agenda. In any event, it is not only what the Court 
decides but, more to the point, how it decides cases that identifies and 
defines the core of the jurisprudence.  
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in this period is not the work of 
an institution that was unnerved by the federal government’s hostility 
toward the Court and its mandate of review. In the face of danger the 
Chief Justice and the Court coalesced and stepped up to the challenge. 
What stands out are the References, both of which provided negative 
answers to questions seeking institutional permission to proceed with 
constitutionally doubtful plans but, in doing so, addressed the 
interpretive or structural framework for constitutional amendments 
affecting national institutions; Tsilhqot’in and Trial Lawyers, both of 
which broke new ground in constitutional interpretation; and 2015 
Charter decisions which formally and informally overruled long-standing 
precedent to move rights protection in new directions on labour relations 
and assisted suicide, before resetting the section 12 jurisprudence to 
place restrictions on the government’s sentencing policies. There is a 
sense of mission in these decisions and perhaps even of a carpe diem 
moment for the Court. With the Court’s composition set to change with 
the retirements of LeBel J. and Rothstein J., a spurned Prime Minister 
determined to close the appointment process to public view and limit 
accountability for his choices, and the telling incidence of dissent in 
some of the 2015 Charter cases, the Court majority might have 
considered it serendipitous — if not strategically opportune — to 
reconsider the constitutional rules and reset the Charter by overruling 
precedent and embedding new authority in the jurisprudence. Looking 
ahead, the cautionary note in reflecting on this “legacy jurisprudence” is 
that most decisions in this period were not decided by a full Court and 
that the configuration on key issues may well change as recent 
appointees take their place in the complement.86  
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The Chief Justice’s role throughout is intriguing and warrants deeper 
reflection. On the political front, she managed the difficult circumstances 
of the Appointment Reference and attack on her integrity skilfully, 
incurring little reputational damage in personal or institutional terms. She 
was able to lead the Court through challenging moments and yet still 
generate a jurisprudence that has set new principles in the constitutional 
bedrock. These accomplishments are beyond what pure serendipity can 
deliver. As discussed, the Chief Justice prioritizes consensus and 
collaboration though, by virtue of her position and institutional history, 
has enormous authority within the Court.87 She eschews thoughts of a 
legacy but has flagged Aboriginal peoples, labour relations, access to 
justice, and matters of conscience (i.e., as in Rodgriguez and Carter) as 
issues of personal concern; it is evident she also cares deeply about and 
is willing to defend the rule of law and integrity of national institutions. 
It hardly seems a coincidence, then, that the Court’s jurisprudence 
produced major shifts in each of these areas, and that the Chief Justice 
played an important role in several as author of the Court’s opinion.88 
Recalling her comment in 2010, that most Charter interpretations had 
already been made, one of the ways to build a legacy — when precedent 
presents an obstacle — is to sweep it away, as was done expressly in the 
labour relations cases and by judicial sleight of hand in Bedford as well 
as in Carter. Whether and how the law and its evolution remain orderly, 
in such circumstances, raises important issues. 
What should not be open to question is the Chief Justice’s legacy in 
2014. Despite her reluctance, the Chief Justice should have a legacy, and 
already does. That legacy extends over her tenure as Chief Justice and her 
many years at the Court as a puisne judge. It is a rich legacy that by now 
includes more than 400 opinions on all manner of issues, and admirable 
leadership of the Court. Even so, it is predictable that 2014 will always 
stand out from her other years on the Court. It was a singular and even 
historic year that was overshadowed by negative and troubling institutional 
dynamics. But more to the point of this review, 2014 was also a singular 
year of legacy building for the Chief Justice and her Court.  
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